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ABSTRACT 
 
Accreditation from the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) is highly 
sought after by business schools both in the United States and internationally. Business schools 
devote considerable resources to earn and maintain the accreditation.  Despite this effort and 
expense, surprisingly little literature has examined the extent to which AACSB accredited schools 
outperform non-accredited schools in market driven situations.  This exploratory study is a first 
effort to fill this gap in the literature.  The research here examines CEOs from large U.S. firms.  
Specifically, compensation earned by CEOs from AACSB accredited schools are compared to 
compensation earned by CEOs from non-accredited schools.  We also examine the extent to which 
CEOs from accredited and non-accredited schools manage their firms differently and earn higher 
profits than other CEOs.  The findings indicate that a large proportion of large firm CEOs earned 
their degree from an AACSB accredited school.  The empirical findings are mixed, but the general 
picture is that graduates from AACSB accredited schools do not outperform other CEOs. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
he Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (AACSB) was organized in 1916 and 
originally included sixteen member schools.  AACSB offers two accreditations, business 
accreditation and specialized accreditation in Accounting.  Both graduate and undergraduate 
programs can be accredited.  In March of 2010, five hundred seventy nine institutions were accredited in Business 
by AACSB.  An additional 170 held specialty accreditation in Accounting.  Less than five percent of business 
schools throughout the world are AACSB accredited.  AASCB is currently the largest business school accrediting 
body (AACSB, 2010). 
 
AACSB is highly sought after by business schools throughout the world.  In order to achieve AACSB 
accreditation, a university must undergo a stringent review process.  The faculty of the accredited program must 
meet various quality standards, generally starting with possessing a Ph.D. from an accredited school.  Faculty must 
also demonstrate their currency by producing publications and other intellectual contributions.  The curriculum, 
facilities, library, administration and other areas must meet established standards.  Indeed, the planning and 
preparation stages for initial accreditation commonly spans years. 
 
The accreditation process is complex.  As such a detailed description is not possible here.  The general 
process is as follows.  A school works with a pre-accreditation team to identify and correct deficiencies that must be 
addressed prior to accreditation.  Annual reports and a self assessment are prepared by the candidate school.  When 
the school believes it has met the standards set forth for accreditation, an initial accreditation visit is conducted with 
the candidate university.  The team reviews the program, facilities, faculty and other issues.  The visit typically 
spans a three day period.  If the accreditation team determines that accreditation standards have been met, they 
recommend accreditation.  The accrediting board reviews this recommendation and makes a final decision.  
Accredited schools must be re-accredited every five years. 
 
T 
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No known academic research has compared the performance of graduates of AACSB accredited schools to 
graduates of schools that do not have AACSB accreditation.  This paper is an exploratory analysis to provide 
preliminary evidence on this issue.  Specifically, this paper examines the CEO's from large U.S. firms.  We analyze 
the educational backgrounds of individuals listed on the Forbes CEO compensation list.  Supplemental data is 
obtained from Standard and Poor's Compustat database.  This paper addresses three questions:  Are CEOs who 
graduated from AACSB accredited schools compensated differently than other CEOs?  Do CEOs who graduated 
from AACSB accredited schools utilize different dividend policies and capital structures?  Do CEOs who graduated 
from AACSB accredited schools earn higher returns for the firms they manage?  While the results are mixed, the 
evidence suggests that firms managed by a CEO from an AACSB accredited school do not outperform CEOs from 
non-accredited schools.  Indeed the preponderance of evidence suggests that CEOs from non-accredited schools 
outperform CEOs from accredited schools. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  In the following section a literature review is provided.  
A discussion of the data and methodology used in the paper follow.  Next, the results of the empirical tests are 
presented.  The paper closes with some concluding comments and a discussion of the limitations of the research. 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
No known literature has examined the performance of firms managed by a graduate from an AACSB 
accredited school relative to those managed by individuals from non-accredited schools.  In a broader context, no 
known research has compared the performance of graduates from AACSB accredited schools to other business 
schools.  Thus, we examine the general literature related to educational background and firm performance to provide 
a basis for the empirical analysis.  
 
Two theories regarding the relationship between education and future earnings are commonly discussed in 
the literature.  The screening theory posits that credentials are a means for individuals to credibly communicate the 
extent of their skills to employers.  Employers use credentials as a screening device when they are not able to fully 
assess the individual's skills.  Heywood (1994) found that signaling effects are strongest in nonunion labor and 
private sector markets.  The human capital theory argues personal knowledge allows an individual to achieve higher 
employment status, regardless of credentials.  The debate over these two theories has gone on for some time.  
Gullason (1999) found that work experience reduces returns to educational signals as experience allows a more 
direct observation of employee quality.  Mariani (1999) finds that individuals with a college degree earn more than 
individuals with less than a bachelor degree.  However, he argues that individuals with lesser education can achieve 
high earnings levels if they have the right skills, and experience, and work in fields with small highly skilled 
workforces.  
 
Wiersema and Bantel (1992) found that CEO demographics affect firm performance.  Characteristics 
including time in position, years with the firm, educational level, and functional background have an impact on firm 
performance.   Gabaix and Landier (2008) found a small difference in CEO talent justifies large pay differences.  
Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert (2002) analyzed the relationship between compensation and educational background of large 
firm CEOs. They identify preferred educational backgrounds for selection as the CEO of a major corporation.  Their 
evidence indicates that CEOs without a college degree earn significantly more than those with a college degree.  
They find little evidence that the school attended affects the compensation that the CEO receives.  They find an 
association between possession of a degree as well as where the degree was earned and the ROA and Tobin’s Q of 
the firm.   
 
Jalbert, Jalbert and Perrina (2004), examined the specific degrees earned by CEOs as it relates to the salary 
the individual earns as CEO and other variables.  The results indicate that the total compensation individuals earn as 
CEO depends upon the degrees the individual holds.  They found a large proportion of large firm CEOs had earned 
an MBA.  Those with differing degrees earned their undergraduate and graduate degrees at different ages, are with 
the firm for differing numbers of years, started working for the firm and became CEO at different ages, and were 
with the firm for varying amounts of time prior to becoming CEO. 
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Gottesman and Morey (2006) examined the relationship between the CEOs education quality and firm 
performance using EXECUCOMP data.  They find firms with CEOs from more prestigious schools, as measured by 
average SAT and GMAT scores, do not outperform those from less prestigious schools. Firms managed by CEOs 
with MBA or law degrees do not perform better than firms with CEOs without a graduate degree.  They find some 
evidence to indicate that firms with CEOs having a non-MBA, non-law graduate degree produce slightly better risk-
adjusted market performance. Their results indicate that compensation is somewhat higher for CEOs who attend 
more prestigious schools.   
 
Collier and Wilson (1994) surveyed Chief Financial Officers of Fortune 1,000 companies regarding 
educational choices. They examined which schools CEO's attended.   They found undergraduate education occurred  
in a larger number of schools than graduate education.  That is they earned their undergraduate degrees from a broad 
selection of universities but their graduate educations were concentrated in a small group of schools.  CFO's 
indicated that in retrospect, their educational preferences were similar to actual choices. 
 
Palia (2000) examined how a CEO’s educational background impacts the type of firms they manage.  He 
compared the performance of individuals based on the prestige of the university where they earned their 
undergraduate and graduate degrees.  The results indicate managers with lower quality educational backgrounds 
manage firms in regulated industries.  Those with higher quality educational backgrounds manage firms in 
unregulated industries.  Other papers that address this issue include Joskow, Rose and Shephard (1993) and Jensen 
and Murphy (1990). 
 
Hambrick and Masson (1984), and Capenter, Geletkanycz and Sanders (2004), examine how management 
homogeneity relates to decision making speed.  They argue that in stable environments, homogeneous teams make 
strategic decisions more quickly and are more profitable than heterogeneous teams.  Westphal and Zajac (1995) 
found that, among Fortune 500 companies, boards of directors prefer CEOs who are demographically similar to 
themselves including on an educational basis.  Moreover, CEO compensation is higher when board members and 
CEOs are demographically similar. 
  
Chevalier and Ellison (1999) examined educational quality of mutual fund managers, as measured by 
average SAT score of the manager’s undergraduate university.  They find mutual funds whose managers are from 
better quality universities outperform others on a risk adjusted basis.  Barker and Mueller (2002) examined how 
CEO background is related to research and development (R&D) spending.  They found the amount of CEO 
education does not impact R&D spending for CEOs with a bachelor’s degree.  However, significant R&D spending 
increases are found at firms where the CEO has an advanced science degree.  
 
Palia and Ravid (2002) examined differences between founding CEOs and non-founder CEOs.    They 
found that founders are less responsive to performance incentives and their firms are more profitable.  Fahlenbrach 
(2009) found that after controlling for a number of factors, investing in founder managed firms produced a 4.4% 
annual abnormal return.  Jalbert and Jalbert (2005) found that founders draw a substantially higher compensation 
than their non-founder counterparts, but this difference depends upon the academic degrees that the individuals hold.    
Founders tend to finish their degrees prior to entering the work force, while non-founders tend to enter the 
workforce prior to earning their degree. 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
 
Each year since 1973, Forbes magazine has published a list containing information about the CEO’s of 
large United States companies.  Forbes examines compensation and other variables for as many as 800 CEOs each 
year.  In 2002, the number of firms included in the analysis was reduced from 800 to 500.  Firms included in the list 
are identified based on several firm size measures.  The Forbes Compensation List is the foundation for this study.  
Some of the data utilized in this study were obtained in electronic format from Forbes, while others were obtained 
from lists presented on the Forbes website.  This educational background information is of interest in this paper.   
 
Data for this paper covers the ten year period 1997-2006 including 6,305 annual firm observations.  For 
thirty-six observations, the data indicated the CEO had a graduate degree, but did not have an undergraduate degree 
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suggesting obvious missing data.  An internet search was conducted to complete the dataset.  Data for eighteen 
observations were identified in this manner.  The remaining observations were coded as missing data.  In order to 
facilitate additional tests, each firm in the Forbes list was matched with its corresponding ticker symbol and matched 
with corresponding data from Standard and Poor’s Compustat.  Financial data on each firm were obtained from 
Compustat. 
 
The data includes 5781 observations where the CEO earned an undergraduate degree and 1099 
observations were an undergraduate degree was not earned or there were missing data.  The primary independent 
variable of interest is if the degree was earned from an AACSB accredited university.  The educational background 
for each CEO in the Forbes dataset was compared against the list of AACSB accredited schools as identified from 
the AACSB website in the Fall of 2009.  Then, each undergraduate and each graduate degree was coded as being 
earned from an AACSB accredited school, or a non-accredited school.  The data includes 4393 observations where 
the CEO earned an undergraduate degree from an AACSB accredited university, and 1388 observations where the 
CEO earned an undergraduate degree from a university that did not have AACSB accreditation.  Thus, about 76 
percent of CEOs that have an undergraduate degree earned the degree from an AACSB accredited school.  Separate 
accounting accreditation is not examined in this paper as it is not possible to determine those CEO's that have a 
degree specifically in accounting based on available data. 
 
The data includes 3644 observations where the CEO earned a graduate degree.  From these, 3410 
observations involved a degree from an AACSB accredited school and 234 observations were for individuals from 
non-accredited schools.  Thus about 94 percent of graduate degrees were earned from an AACSB accredited school.  
The data includes 5272 observations where the CEO earned either a graduate degree or an undergraduate degree 
from an AACSB accredited school and 1033 earned neither an undergraduate or graduate degree from an AACSB 
accredited school.  The evidence clearly indicates that having a degree from an AACSB accredited school increases 
an individual's chance of becoming CEO of a major corporation. 
 
We complete an analysis on the entire dataset.  However, it is not clear that AACSB would necessarily 
impact the education of all CEOs.  Some CEOs earned degrees that were not business related.    For example, some 
individuals earned their undergraduate degree in Engineering.  Thus, while the individual attended an AACSB 
accredited school, AACSB may have no impact on the degree that the individual earned.  To control for this factor, 
our second analysis limits the data to those individuals that earned a degree in a business related field.  Specifically, 
we reduce the data to include only those CEOs where the data clearly indicates that the degree was a Bachelor 
Degree in Business Administration or an MBA.   
 
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics of the variables examined in this paper.  The first and second 
columns in the table show the mean and standard deviation of each variable respectively.  The data included 356 
undergraduate business degree observations with 301 having degrees from an accredited school and 55 having 
degrees from non-accredited schools.  The data include 1,849 graduate business degree observations including 1,813 
observations from accredited schools and 31 observations from non-accredited schools.  School attended was not 
reported for five observations.  It was necessary to eliminate 234 observations from the data because they involved 
an individual who earned both an undergraduate and graduate degree in business.  In all but four of these cases at 
least one of the degrees was from an AACSB accredited school.  Thus, distinguishing between the performance of 
individuals from accredited versus not accredited schools was not feasible for this group. 
 
Dependent Variables 
 
The first set of dependent variables measure compensation earned by the CEO.  Total compensation, TC, is 
total compensation earned by the CEO as reported by Forbes.   Total compensation includes salary, bonus, stock 
compensation and other compensation.  Total compensation measures the reward CEOs  receive for all activities 
performed for the firm.  These activities include both management and investing activities.  Murphy (2003) and 
Murphy and Hall (2002), among others, have documented the importance of differentiating between compensation 
components.  To address this issue, salary, SAL, and salary plus bonus SB, variables identify the impact of an 
AACSB accredited education on components of service provided by the CEO.  These variables eliminate the 
compensation related to investment activities.  These variables are all reported in thousands of dollars. 
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The second set of dependent variables measure the CEO's managerial approach.  CEOs exert exclusive or 
significant control over a variety of managerial issues including capital structure and dividend policy which indicate 
the methods by which the firm's assets are financed. A full discussion of capital structure issues is beyond the scope 
of this paper.  The interested reader is referred to Modigliani and Miller (1958); Modigliani and Miller (1963); 
Miller (1977); DeAngelo and Masulis (1980); and Jalbert (2002) for a discussion of the issue.  CEOs are also 
instrumental in determining dividend policies.  Miller and Modigliani (1961) proposed an irrelevance theory 
suggesting that in an idealized world, dividends do not affect firm value.  However, many articles find that dividends 
play important roles within the firm (Easterbrook, 1984; and Bhattacharyya, Mawani and Morrill, 2008a and 2008b) 
We incorporate two variables into the analysis here to capture management differences.  The dividend payout ratio 
of the firm, PAYOUT, and debt to assets ratio, Debt-to-Assets, are incorporated into the analysis to capture any 
managerial effects. 
 
Table 1:  Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A:  Full Sample 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Salary 836.58 513.52 
Salary + Bonus 2,873.86 6,979.50 
Total Comp. 8,225.42 24,047.26 
Payout 27.08 681.69 
Debt To Assets 26.19 22.61 
ROA 4.1 14.47 
ROE 13.02 153.30 
One Year Return 54.18 2,138.45 
Three Year Return 16.77 31.74 
Price To Book 6.26 100.35 
Panel B: Undrgrad Bus. Deg. 
Salary 848.27 341.29 
Salary + Bonus 2,645.32 3,624.30 
Total Comp. 6,504.49 9,715.33 
Payout -85.21 1,986.63 
Debt To Assets 25.13 40.75 
ROA 4.86 10.02 
ROE 32.66 323.30 
One Year Return 536.44 9,116.66 
Three Year Return 14.07 22.94 
Price To Book 5.86 95.63 
Panel C:  Grad.  Bus. Deg. 
Salary 845.77 542.12 
Salary + Bonus 3,048.47 9,644.63 
Total Comp. 8,243.08 18,440.54 
Payout 23.88 421.76 
Debt To Assets 26.12 19.04 
ROA 4.58 7.78 
ROE 17.30 55.97 
One Year Return 19.94 72.17 
Three Year Return 16.12 34.40 
Price To Book 6.77 153.39 
This table shows descriptive statistics.  Dollar figures are reported in thousands of dollars.   
 
The third set of dependent variables measure CEO performance.  If higher paid CEOs produce superior 
returns for investors, large compensation packages are justified.  For a very large company, a small improvement in 
returns, can justify the payment of substantially higher CEO salaries.  Moreover, if a graduate of an AACSB 
accredited program produces higher returns than other CEOs, they should be the preferred hire.  This paper 
examines the extent to which hiring a CEO that has an AACSB accredited degree impacts performance.  We include 
five measures of firm performance in the analysis.  Return on Assets, ROA, Return on Equity, ROE, one year return, 
ONE YEAR RETURN, three year return, THREE YEAR RETURN, and the price to book ratio, PRICE TO BOOK. 
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Control Variables 
 
The analysis includes four control variables.  The first variable is if the current CEO is the firm founder.  
Jalbert and Jalbert (2005) found that founder CEOs have markedly different educational backgrounds than other 
CEOs.  Fahlenbrach (2009) found that founder managed firms had higher capital expenditures, made more focused 
mergers and acquisitions, and provided positive abnormal returns to their investors.  While the evidence on founder 
pay is mixed, the evidence strongly suggests that founder managed firms outperform.  Jalbert, Rao and Jalbert 
(2002), Fahlengrach, (2005) and Adams, Ammeida and Ferreira (2009) each found that founder CEOs earned higher 
returns for investors than non-founders, with differences as high as 11 percent.   To capture the effect that a 
founding CEO has on the firm, the variable FOUNDER is included in the analysis indicating if the current CEO 
founded the firm.   
 
The second control variable is firm size.  We measure firm size based on the total assets employed by the 
firm, ASSETS. The relationship between firm size, firm characteristics and performance issues is well established in 
the literature.  Banz (1981) and Reinganum (1981) were the first to identify the size effect as it relates to stock 
returns. Recent studies examine the relationship between firm size and CEO compensation (see Jalbert, Rao and 
Jalbert, 2002; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992; Baker Jensen and Murphy, 1988 and Baker and Hall, 2002).  The general 
findings are that CEOs of larger firms earn more money, and manage their firms differently.   
 
The third control variable is the industry that the firm operates within, INDUS.  The analysis here measures 
industry using two digit industry sector codes.   It is well known that firms in different industries operate differently 
and are characterized by differing employer-employee relationships.  Datta and Guthrie (1994) suggested that 
industry specific experience is essential for CEOs.  Roach and Goedde (2003), John, Saunders and Senbet, 2000; 
Hermalin and Wallace, 2001 and Barragato (2002) each examine CEO compensation within a specific industry.  
Each of these studies noted peculiarities of executive compensation based on industry.  Joskow, Rose and Wolfram 
(1996) show that political and regulatory constraints had an effect on CEO compensation in utility industries.   
 
A final control variable, STAB, measures the risk of the firm.  Beaty and Zajac (1994) found the use of 
executive compensation contracts to motivate managers is limited by managerial risk aversion.  Many others have 
documented a relationship between firm performance and various measures of risk. We incorporate, earnings 
stability, as obtained from the Compustat database into the model. The Compustat earnings stability score ranks 
firms from 1 to 5 based on the stability of their earnings.  
 
RESULTS 
 
The empirical analysis begins by regressing the accreditation variables individually on several 
compensation variables, variables that to one degree or another are directly impacted by the CEO and several 
measures of return.  The results are presented in Table 2. The equation for the first regression in Panel A of Table 2 
is: 
 
                (1) 
 
where SAL is the annual salary of the CEO and UGA is a dummy variable set to one if the CEO earned an 
undergraduate degree from an accredited school and zero if the degree was earned from a non-accredited school. 
 
Table 2, Panels A, B and C present the full sample results.  In Panel A, undergraduate degrees are 
examined.  The results are surprising.  AACSB is significantly related to only two of eleven dependent variables. 
AACSB is not related to the compensation or management variables.  More surprising is that, when significant, 
AACSB has a negative effect.  Specifically, earning a degree from an AACSB accredited school is negatively 
related to three year return and price-to-book ratio. The first result indicates that graduates from AACSB accredited 
schools provide lower returns for their shareholders.  The second result indicates that investors are willing to pay 
less to acquire the assets of a firm managed by a CEO from an AACSB accredited school.  These findings are 
certainly disturbing, in light of the considerable effort that is required for a school to achieve and maintain AACSB 
accreditation.  
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Table 2:  AACSB Single Regression Results 
Panel A:  Undergraduate AACSB  Full Sample 
Dependent Variable Constant Coefficient T-statistic N 
Salary 859.34 -22.15 -1.373 5,272 
Salary + Bonus 2,914.43 -83.909 -0.401 5,735 
Total Compensation 8,292.39 -493.20 -0.779 5,696 
Payout 10.91 15.16 0.881 5,222 
Debt To Assets 26.00 0.39 0.534 5,248 
ROA 4.27 -0.102 -0.220 5,262 
ROE 11.35 4.56 1.060 5,115 
One Year Return 29.63 34.87 0.473 5,121 
Three Year Return 18.20 -1.99 -1.865* 4,907 
Price To Book 12.64 -8.33 -2.256** 4,420 
Panel B:  Graduate AACSB  Full Sample 
Salary 844.62 -3.15 -0.090 3,305 
Salary + Bonus 2,744.06 220.10 0.409 3,609 
Total Compensation 6,933.64 1,241.33 1.027 3,588 
Payout 74.40 -46.17 -1.711* 3,315 
Debt To Assets 26.24 0.629 0.405 3,333 
ROA 3.63 0.36 0.330 3,343 
ROE 12.84 1.97 0.407 3,247 
One Year Return 43.35 -19.10 -2.693*** 3,259 
Three Year Return 21.78 -5.217 -2.114** 3,134 
Price To Book 5.54 0.605 0.071 2,815 
Panel C:  Either Graduate or Undergraduate AACSB Full Sample 
Salary 820.25 19.59 1.078 5,758 
Salary + Bonus 2,923.83 -59.72 -0.250 6,249 
Total Compensation 10,625.72 -2,865.21 -3.462*** 6,199 
Payout 46.36 -23.07 -0.946 5,698 
Debt To Assets 24.71 1.77 2.190** 5,722 
ROA 3.817 0.337 0.651 5,738 
ROE -3.12 19.20 3.433*** 5,575 
One Year Return 31.87 26.55 0.339 5,574 
Three Year Return 19.23 -2.91 -2.432** 5,336 
Price To Book 9.93 -3.73 -0.948 4,817 
Panel D: Undergraduate Only 
Salary 911.06 -74.25 -1.417 323 
Salary + Bonus 2,338.07 362.55 0.676 353 
Total Compensation 6,644.76 -165.60 -0.115 352 
Payout 6.73 -110.47 -0.365 309 
Debt To Assets 23.11 2.43 0.391 309 
ROA 3.85 1.20 0.789 309 
ROE 7.04 30.83 0.626 307 
One Year Return 21.31 618.16 0.441 305 
Three Year Return 16.71 -3.153 -0.870 291 
Price To Book 2.54 4.01 0.258 265 
Panel E: Graduate Only 
Salary 730.28 117.84 1.159 1667 
Salary + Bonus 1,749.39 1,326.31 0.758 1824 
Total Compensation 4,291.19 4,037.26 1.207 1816 
Payout 37.11 -13.41 -0.172 1681 
Debt To Assets 24.25 1.92 0.546 1687 
ROA 6.47 -1.91 -1.334 1693 
ROE 16.08 1.27 0.119 1649 
One Year Return 60.57 -41.34 -3.114** 1655 
Three Year Return 30.71 -14.84 -2.264** 1586 
Price To Book 6.82 -0.031 -0.001 1435 
This table shows single regression results. The independent variable indicates if the CEO earned their degree from an AACSB accredited 
school.  Panel A analyzes undergraduate degrees.  Panel B analyzes graduate degrees.  Panel C analyzes CEO's that earned either an 
undergraduate or graduate degree from an AACSB accredited schools.  Panel D repeats the analysis in Panel C, however; individuals that 
do not have a degree were eliminated from the analysis. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
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In Panel B of Table 2, graduate school results are presented.  Again, AACSB does not affect any of the 
compensation variables.  However, there is evidence of different managerial styles and performance.  The results 
show a negative relationship between accreditation and Payout Ratio, one year return and three year return.  The 
return results are significant at the 1 and 5 percent levels respectively.  The payout ratio results indicate that CEOs 
with an accredited degree pay a smaller portion of their earnings in dividends than other CEOs.   
 
Panel C of Table 2 presents the combined degree results.  Here there is some evidence that AACSB 
accreditation has an impact on compensation.  The results indicate that total compensation is negatively related to an 
AACSB degree.  The debt-to-assets ratio is larger for CEOs from accredited schools indicating that graduates from 
accredited programs manage their capital structures somewhat differently than other CEOs.  ROE is positively 
related to having an AACSB accredited degree.  This is the first finding to suggest that graduates with an AACSB 
accredited degree may outperform other CEOs.  However, the three year return is negatively related to an AACSB 
accredited degree.  Thus the evidence on performance here is mixed. 
 
Panel D of Table 2 shows the reduced sample undergraduate degree analysis.  Interestingly, having an 
AACSB accredited degree is not significant in explaining any of the dependent variables.  Panel E presents the 
reduced sample graduate degree analysis.  One Year Return and Three Year Return are negatively related to having 
an AACSB accredited degree.  This evidence indicates that those with an AACSB accredited degree underperform 
those with a non-accredited degree. 
 
Next, we examine multiple regressions on the full dataset.  The analysis includes the control variables 
defined earlier.   The equation for the first regression in Panel A is specified as follows: 
 
                                                                (2) 
 
The results are presented in Table 3.  In Panel A, the undergraduate results on the full sample are analyzed.  
The results indicate that AACSB is negatively significant in explaining the Price-to-Book ratio, indicating that 
investors are willing to pay less for the assets of a firm managed by a CEO with an AACSB degree. The control 
variables have signs that are generally consistent with expectations.  One interesting exception is that the founders 
variable is negatively related to salary, but positively related to Salary + Bonus and Total Compensation.  This 
finding indicates that founders take a smaller base salary, but earn more in other compensation than non-founders.  
The full sample graduate school results are presented in Panel B of Table 3.  AACSB accreditation is negatively 
related to the payout ratio of the firm, indicating that AACSB CEO's retain more earnings within the firm than their 
non-AACSB CEO counterparts.  AACSB accreditation is marginally significant and negative in explaining one and 
three year returns.  Panel C of Table 3 presents the combined degree results.  AACSB is negatively related to the 
total compensation that the CEO receives.  However, AACSB is positively related to Return on Equity (ROE).  
AACSB is not significant in explaining the variance in the other dependent variables.   
 
Table 4 presents the results on the reduced samples.  Panel A presents the graduate school results. An 
AACSB graduate degree is only significant in explaining variations in one variable, ONE-YR-RETURN.  The 
relationship is negative and significant at the one percent level.  The undergraduate sample results in Panel B, 
indicate that AACSB does not explain the variation in any of the dependent variables.   
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Table 3:  Multiple Regressions on Full Dataset 
Undergrad 
Dependent Var. Constant FNDER Asset INDUS Stab. AACSB N/R2 
Salary 902.04 -136.19 
-5.05*** 
0.001 
9.901*** 
-5.515 
-9.358*** 
30.63 
5.139*** 
-25.98 
-1.54 
4713 
0.051 
Salary + Bonus 2597.40 774.57 
2.132** 
0.009 
9.515*** 
-19.71 
-2.497** 
168.37 
2.083** 
-184.68 
-0.815 
5130 
0.020 
Total Comp. 5984.21 5890.90 
5.434** 
0.022 
8.205*** 
-10.767 
-0.457 
278.39 
1.151 
-163.50 
-0.242 
5101 
0.018 
Payout -48.35 0.236 
0.008 
-0.00003 
0.419 
-0.259 
-0.389 
15.660 
2.306** 
13.143 
0.691 
5128 
0.001 
Debt-To-Assets 40.30 -0.693 
-0.593 
-0.00003 
9.906*** 
-0.113 
-4.452*** 
-2.677 
-10.392*** 
0.519 
0.712 
5152 
0.038 
ROE -45.37 -7.726 
-1.103 
-0.00001 
-0.828 
-0.093 
-0.613 
14.03 
8.365*** 
3.049 
0.701 
5021 
0.015 
One Yr Return 263.50 -40.15 
-0.327 
-0.00006 
-0.200 
4.276 
1.638 
-85.48 
-2.90*** 
47.73 
0.635 
5020 
0.002 
Three Yr Return 12.426 14.127 
8.218*** 
-0.00001 
-2.810*** 
0.146 
4.050*** 
-0.060 
-0.130 
-1.313 
-1.255 
4814 
0.020 
Price-To-Book 
 
30.267 28.29 
4.761 
0.000002 
0.133 
-0.095 
-0.736 
-3.851 
-2.824*** 
-8.056 
-2.184** 
4413 
0.009 
Graduate 
Salary 907.72 -224.35 
-6.527 
0.001 
7.852*** 
-5.759 
-8.159*** 
37.98 
5.109*** 
-45.61 
-1.273 
2969 
0.067 
Salary + Bonus 2719.53 724.69 
1.270 
0.009 
6.591*** 
-23.767 
-2.048** 
137.07 
1.109 
124.96 
0.211 
3242 
0.015 
Total Comp. 5562.42 2843.65 
2.320** 
0.018 
5.985*** 
-21.219 
-0.852 
369.21 
1.385 
830.15 
0.655 
3227 
0.013 
Payout -31.19 -15.06 
-0.564 
-0.000001 
-0.023 
1.133 
2.086** 
16.547 
2.864*** 
-50.382 
-1.831* 
3244 
0.005 
Debt-To-Assets 37.727 -0.918 
-0.628 
0.00003 
9.854 
-0.055 
-1.828* 
-2.610 
-8.251*** 
1.091 
0.717 
3260 
0.045 
ROE -32.06 -2.945 
-0.632 
-0.00001 
-0.958 
-0.136 
-1.437 
11.899 
10.78*** 
-0.962 
-0.199 
3177 
0.035 
One Yr Return 93.40 24.78 
3.750*** 
-0.00002 
-1.496 
0.619 
4.670*** 
-17.526 
-11.304*** 
-12.898 
-1.904* 
3191 
0.0532 
Three Yr Return 18.74 18.31 
7.673*** 
-0.00001 
-2.459** 
-0.128 
2.719*** 
-0.611 
-0.977 
-4.496 
-1.850* 
3071 
0.026 
Price-To-Book 27.087 32.19 
3.873*** 
0.000004 
0.223 
-0.121 
-0.715 
-4.994 
-2.689*** 
2.973 
0.348 
2810 
0.009 
Either 
Salary 875.09 -132.83 
-5.28*** 
0.001 
9.216*** 
-5.223 
-8.857*** 
35.73 
6.155*** 
29.68 
-1.536 
5140 
0.046 
Salary + Bonus 2433.49 942.96 
2.894 
0.009 
10.234*** 
-17.793 
-2.341** 
159.80 
2.109** 
-30.759 
-0.123 
5582 
0.021 
Total Comp. 4874.19 9403.42 
8.239*** 
0.023 
7.309*** 
18.521 
0.693 
660.586 
2.471** 
-2115.90 
-2.396** 
5544 
0.022 
Payout -19.04 -11.71 
-0.357 
-0.00002 
0.183 
0.226 
0.295 
14.81 
1.942* 
-29.86 
-1.188 
5589 
0.001 
Debt-To-Assets 40.154 -1.172 
-1.119 
0.00003 
10.57*** 
-0.13. 
-5.296*** 
-2.784 
-11.45*** 
1.762 
2.184** 
5611 
0.042 
ROE -67.89 -4.682 
-0.632 
-0.00001 
-0.671 
-0.203 
-1.176 
17.248 
9.287*** 
14.899 
2.608*** 
5457 
0.019 
One Yr Return 231.19 -32.56 
-0.307 
-0.00005 
-0.211 
4.051 
1.666* 
-78.04 
-2.904*** 
47.239 
0.585 
5455 
0.002 
Three Yr Return 11.126 14.607 
9.362*** 
-0.00001 
-2.733*** 
0.135 
3.812*** 
0.333 
0.761 
-1.458 
-1.223 
5225 
0.022 
Price-To-Book 
 
24.52 23.414 
4.565*** 
0.000001 
0.110 
-0.090 
-0.749 
-3.773 
-3.058*** 
-1.077 
-0.271 
4806 
0.007 
This table shows multiple regression results on the full sample.  In Panel A, the results examine undergraduate degrees.  The results in Panel B 
are for graduate degrees.  Panel C considers those CEO's that earned either their undergraduate or graduate degree from an AACSB accredited 
school.  The first figure in each cell is the regression coefficient.  The second figure in each cell is the T-statistic.  ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
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Table 4:  Multiple Regressions on Reduced Data Sets including only CEO who Earned a Business Degree 
Graduate 
Dependent Var. Constant FNDER Asset INDUS Stab. AACSB N/R2 
Salary 847.98 -180.51 
-3.06*** 
0.001 
6.237*** 
-6.464 
-5.191*** 
27.27 
2.221** 
81.40 
0.777 
1502 
0.054 
Salary + Bonus 2024.32 -472.09 
-0.456 
0.011 
3.908*** 
-0.723 
-0.033 
-78.475 
-0.361 
1137.69 
0.617 
1642 
0.010 
Total Comp. 755.73 990.50 
0.513 
0.018 
3.426*** 
27.311 
0.671 
564.163 
1.388 
3582.13 
1.040 
1635 
0.010 
Payout -76.11 -9.384 
-0.213 
0.00005 
0.401 
1.546 
1.663* 
13.563 
1.476 
-13.203 
-0.168 
1647 
0.003 
Debt-To-Assets 36.110 0.930 
0.495 
0.00003 
5.220*** 
-0.071 
-1.803* 
-2.255 
-5.768*** 
0.958 
0.285 
1652 
0.034 
ROE -15.369 -4.779 
-0.809 
-0.00002 
-1.420 
-0.344 
-2.806*** 
9.846 
7.479*** 
1.631 
0.154 
1616 
0.020 
One Yr Return 78.835 -3.745 
-0.492 
-0.00003 
-1.569 
0.625 
3.950*** 
-9.260 
-5.322*** 
-37.850 
-2.863*** 
1619 
0.033 
Three Yr Return 25.93 11.732 
3.154*** 
-0.00002 
-2.221** 
0.088 
1.137 
0.327 
0.329 
-14.423 
-2.207 
1553 
0.014 
Price-To-Book 
 
51.89 69.34 
4.069*** 
0.00001 
0.326 
-0.446 
-1.240 
-7.541 
-2.085** 
-1.089 
-0.037 
1432 
0.016 
Undergraduate 
Salary 923.44 12.26 
0.154 
0.001 
5.346*** 
-1.544 
-0.896 
8.829 
0.469 
-111.30 
-2.071 
278 
0.106 
Salary + Bonus 2511.21 -1182.94 
-1.428 
0.005 
3.254*** 
-36.583 
-1.981** 
246.72 
1.212 
322.15 
0.560 
304 
0.060 
Total Comp. 5824.84 -407.78 
-0.197 
0.023 
6.153*** 
-23.679 
-0.513 
358.90 
0.706 
1000.38 
-0.697 
304 
0.117 
Payout 303.21 202.66 
0.456 
0.000 
0.358 
-16.60 
-1.685* 
57.28 
0.526 
-109.11 
-0.356 
306 
0.011 
Debt-To-Assets 39.74 11.67 
1.282 
0.000005 
0.299 
-0.247 
-1.224 
-1.989 
-0.891 
2.223 
0.355 
306 
0.013 
ROE 27.257 -28.10 
-0.387 
-0.00003 
-0.266 
-0.751 
-0.466 
1.483 
0.083 
34.88 
0.488 
304 
0.003 
One Yr Return 3559.38 -793.72 
-0.392 
0.000 
-0.085 
58.90 
1.307 
-1230.70 
-2.404** 
609.15 
0.433 
302 
0.026 
Three Yr Return -12.03 9.713 
1.880* 
-0.000003 
-0.373 
0.098 
0.876 
5.482 
3.65*** 
-3.395 
-0.966 
288 
0.067 
Price-To-Book 
 
9.675 -3.226 
-0.146 
-0.000005 
-0.146 
-0.114 
-0.218 
-0.680 
-0.122 
4.464 
0.284 
265 
0.001 
This table shows multiple regression results on the undergraduate and graduate school samples.  The sample is reduced to include only 
those individuals who earned a business degree. In Panel A, the results examine undergraduate degrees.  The results in Panel B are for 
graduate degrees.  The first figure in each cell is the regression coefficient.  The second figure in each cell is the T-statistic.  ***, ** and 
* indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively. 
 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
 
This paper is an exploratory study of the educational background of CEOs from large firms.  CEOs are in a 
position to exert significant influence over a wide range of issues.  It is important to understand how CEOs from 
different backgrounds are compensated differently, manage the firm differently, and produce different returns. The 
analysis in this paper examines universities where the CEO earned their university level degrees.  Universities are 
classified as being AACSB accredited or not accredited.  Firms are compared based on the degrees held by the CEO.  
The goal of the paper is to determine if graduates from AACSB accredited schools are compensated differently, 
manage differently, and produce better results than CEOs from other schools.  Data from the Forbes CEO 
compensation list is combined with Compustat data including 6,305 firm year observations from 1997-2006.  
 
The results indicate that a high proportion of CEOs earn their degrees from AACSB accredited schools. 
About 76% of CEO's that held an undergraduate degree earned it from an AACSB accredited school.  About 94% of 
graduate degrees were earned from an AACSB accredited school.  Thus there is clear evidence that graduates from 
accredited schools have an increased chance of becoming the CEO of a large firm. 
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The empirical results are somewhat surprising.  While the evidence is mixed, the preponderance of the 
evidence suggests negative relationships between having an AACSB accredited degree and performance as CEO. 
The most consistent evidence is found among one year and three year returns, where CEOs with non-accredited 
degrees provide higher returns than those with AACSB accredited degrees. 
 
As noted earlier, this is an exploratory study and is limited in a number of ways.  First, this paper examines 
only CEOs.  Universities graduate many individuals that do not achieve the top firm CEO level.  Thus the results 
here may not generalizable to a broader group.  Second, there could be confounding variables which, if included in 
the model, could change the results reported here.  Third, this analysis examines only the educational background of 
the CEO.  Many individuals come together to make up the upper management team of a large firm.  The collective 
educational backgrounds of the upper management team might differ significantly from that of the CEO.  The fourth 
limitation is that the accreditation determination was made as of 2009, while all the degrees held by CEOs were 
earned sometime prior to 2009.  Thus, some schools may not have been accredited at the time the CEO earned their 
degree.  Nevertheless, the analysis here considers the degree to be from an AACSB accredited school, regardless of 
when the degree was earned.   
 
Future studies should analyze a broader cross section of graduates to gain additional insights into the value 
of AACSB accreditation.  Further research should also examine a larger set of control variables to more precisely 
identify the relationships.  Finally, the degrees held by the entire upper management team could be analyzed to 
identify the overall impact of AACSB.  While AACSB accreditation is often touted as the "Gold Standard" of 
business school accreditation, a great deal of research remains to be done to verify this contention. 
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